One hundred years after the Swedish scientist Arrhenius warned that coal-burning might change the climate, it is time to take stock. The world has warmed by 0.5°C, and we now have a Framework Convention on Climate Change. But will this treaty help or hinder humanity's response to the fundamental threat of global warming?

The intensely political process of drafting the convention has resulted in a text not so much characterised by compromise but by an effort to avoid the resolution of conflicting positions through vagueness and ambiguity.

The preamble to the convention acknowledges that human activities are enhancing the natural greenhouse effect which will result in an additional warming of the Earth's surface, which "may adversely affect natural ecosystems and humankind".

It states that "the largest share of historical and current global emissions of greenhouse gases has originated in industrial countries, that per capita emissions in developing countries are still relatively low and that the share of global emissions originating in developing countries will grow to meet their social and development needs".

Although recognising scientific uncertainties and the need to continuously re-evaluate actions on the basis of new findings, the preamble also recognises that "various actions to address climate change can be justified economically in their own right and can also help in solving other environmental problems". In other words, many actions taken to cope with climate change are what policy makers call "win-win" actions. The need for industrial countries to take immediate action is recognised, as are the special difficulties of countries dependent upon fossil fuel production, use and export, and the vulnerability of island states and countries with sensitive ecosystems.

The stated objective of the convention is the "stabilisation of greenhouse gas concentrations... at a level which would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system". This should be achieved "within a time frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally..., to ensure that food production is not threatened and to enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner".

Setting aside the fact that humanity may already have changed climate beyond the bounds at which "dangerous interference" is inevitable, the vagueness of this objective creates ample opportunityfor endless negotiation on subsequent protocols.

As any scientist could have informed the negotiators, defining a level of climate change within which ecosystem adaptation can occur naturally is virtually impossible. Food production is already threatened by climate change in many parts of the world. But who is to decide whether this is the result of natural or anthropogenic processes? Whose economic development should be allowed to proceed in a sustainable manner? And how will "sustainable" be defined?

Stabilisation of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere is a truly long-term objective. Governments usually talk of stabilising emissions. But some scientists have estimated that at least a 60 per cent reduction in emissions will be required to stabilise atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide, for example. Although no concentration is specified, this is an important principle. However, the convention is far from a binding undertaking actually to stabilise concentrations.

Article 3, the Principles, reinforces many of the points stated in the preamble, and indeed in the whole of Agenda 21, the Earth Charter, and the Biodiversity Convention. It is stated that protection of the climate system is for the benefit of present and future generations, and should be carried out in an equitable manner by industrial and developing countries, according to historic responsibility, state of development and capacity to respond.

The precautionary principle is recognised, along with the need to take into account cost- effectiveness, and "ensure global benefits at the lowest possible cost". A globally comprehensive approach is accepted as a principle, which means that cooperative arrangements can be reached between interested parties (joint implementation). So a rich country looking for the most cost- effective strategy for their share of emission reduction might pay a poor country to plant trees or clean up dirty industries, and take the credit for the resulting reduction.

Perhaps the most important text lies in Article 4, Commitments, and Article 12 "Communication of information related to implementation".

Article 4 deals with control targets, and it is on this issue that the Convention on Climate Change is at its most confusing and convoluted. The only apparent indication of an explicit target for the industrial world is in Article 4, Commitments, which at one point refers to the "aim of returning (greenhouse gas emissions) individually or jointly to their 1990 levels". An earlier paragraph says that "return by the end of the present decade to earlier levels of anthropogenic emissions" will "demonstrate that developed nations are taking the lead in modifying longer-term trends... consistent with the objective of the Convention". Taken together, some commentators say that this is indistinguishable from a binding commitment to stabilise greenhouse gases at 1990 levels by the year 2000. Others, notably the United States, would firmly disagree.

The wording of the latter reference to stabilisation is perhaps more significant as an implicit recognition of the power of the position many Southern nations have taken on climate change: limited involvement unless those industrial nations with historical responsibility for the problem take action first. Is the primary motivation for stabilisation on the part of the industrial world concern for the planetary environment or a less than altruistic fear that rising emissions in developing nations may exacerbate the problem in decades to come?

In fact, stabilisation of emissions may not prove a particularly convincing or helpful achievement. Firstly, the slow economic growth expected in many industrial nations to the end of the century will stabilise emissions automatically. Secondly, even if the OECD nations meet this target, the rate of warming to 2100 will only be reduced by S per cent or so. Stabilisation thus represents little more than a commitment to "business as usual".

Article 4 reveals that the only firm commitment is that industrial countries should report on progress towards stabilisation - not that they should necessarily achieve this end. But the commitment to reporting is nonetheless strong and significant. Parties shall "develop, periodically update, publish and make available to the Conference of the Parties, in accordance with Article 12, national inventories of anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of all greenhouse gases...". Parties shall "formulate, implement, publish, and regularly update" national and regional programmes to deal with climate change.

Article 12 describes the reporting obligations in more detail. After six months, to allow the convention to enter into force, industrial countries will have to submit an initial communication detailing inventories, control programmes and emission projections. Developing countries will report three years after they receive funding to cover both the full incremental costs of carrying out national reports, and the costs of taking action. Least developed countries will report at their discretion.

The adequacy of the approach described in Article 4 will be reviewed by the Conference of the Parties at its first session, with the possibility of amendment if necessary.

Although the United States may have achieved their objective in avoiding what they see as a binding commitment, they lost on the issue of wanting cuts in chlorofluorocarbon (CFC) emissions to be counted towards any reduction objective. Article 4 makes it clear that the convention relates to carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol on CFCs.

Article 5 contains commitments to support, develop, and strengthen scientific research and systematic observation, and to improve developing countries' own capacity to carry out such research. The next Article concerns the need to promote the development and implementation of public awareness, education, and participation programmes in addressing climate change and its effects, and the training of scientific, technical and managerial personnel.

Article 7 establishes the work of the Conference of the Parties, which is the convention's supreme body, responsible for regularly reviewing implementation, developing comparable methodologies for greenhouse gas inventories, and general coordination and information exchange.

Articles 8, 9 and 10 establish a Secretariat, a scientific and technological advisory body, and an advisory body on implementation. The scientific and technological advisory body will assess the latest scientific findings on climate change and the impact of the convention, and identify relevant technologies and advise on transfer. The implementation body will review national reports and assess the cumulative effectiveness of national actions on ameliorating climate change.

A mechanism for providing financial resources on a grant or concessional basis, for activities such as technology transfer is defined but not specifically identified under Article 11. As with the Montreal Protocol, the financial mechanism is the key to the convention, since the convention contains few, if any, specific obligations for developing countries. It is made clear in the convention that implementing commitments depends on money and technology transfer. Developing countries' participation will become increasingly important as their contribution to total global greenhouse gases increases. Unless the developing countries are drawn into taking action at an early stage through effective funding mechanisms, there is little hope of getting them to accept any future amendments binding them to action.

Under Article 4, the industrial countries (minus the Eastern European states), agree to meet the full costs of developing countries preparing national reports. They also agree to provide the financial resources for carrying out inventories, preparing adaptation responses, and preparing and implementing programmes to mitigate against climate change. The latter point could include conservation and enhancement of reservoirs and sinks, among other measures. The details of the funding mechanism (including the amounts of funding required, and a review of those amounts), are left to the Conference of the Parties but in the interim, the funding will go through the Global Environment Facility (GEF), after it has been appropriately restructured to ensure equitable and balanced representation and a transparent system of governance. To sum up, pending the reform of the GEF and the meeting of the Conference of the Parties, there is no money on the table.

The remaining Articles, 13 to 26, deal with the legal aspects of the convention common to other treaties, such as amendments, resolution of disputes, entry into force, and ratification.

A separate resolution on interim arrangements requests the Secretary General of the United Nations to make the necessary arrangements for preparing for the first meeting of the Conference of the Parties. The first Preparatory meeting may not take place before the end of 1992.

Many of the criticisms of the convention were related to its weakness in terms of lack of binding commitments and firm targets. In fact, the main mechanism to make countries abide by the convention will not necessarily be legalistic, but may depend upon public accountability, openess, peer review, and pressure. Permanent and comprehensive reporting and review mechanisms substitute for clearly defined reduction targets in , achieving the difficult overall objective of "stabilisation of greenhouse gas concentrations... at a level which would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system". This should be achieved "within a time frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally..., to ensure that food production is not threatened and to enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner". If this approach does not work, then the possibility for amendment and additional protocols is contained within the convention.

For most of the world's people, however, it is not controlling greenhouse gas emissions that is the priority, but ensuring adequate protection from the impact of climate change and sea level rise. Even with drastic cuts in emissions, some global warming is thought to be inevitable. This point was made many times during the negotiations, particularly by developing country delegates. That the convention does not mention the importance of facilitating human adaptation is a lamentable deficiency.

On a more positive note, the historical responsibility of the industrial nations in creating the problem is acknowledged, as is the extreme vulnerability of the developing world. The treaty recognises the challenge faced by developing nations in ensuring that their socioeconomic development does not increase their contribution to global warming to an unacceptable level. Moreover, the convention clearly endorses the need for precautionary action regardless of remaining scientific uncertainties.

But the overwhelming impression is of a document based largely on the self-interest of the powerful, sprinkled with a few concessions to ensure the compliance of the rest.

There is no evidence that the world's politicians have understood the true import of climate change and its implications for the development process. And that is the main problem with the Framework Convention on Climate Change. Even a statement of principle alone, with no firm commitments, would have been preferable if it recognised the full significance of global warming and provided a clear agenda for action. As it is, we are left with an ambiguous document which will allow politicians to fiddle on as the world warms.

So, has the effort expended on developing the climate treaty been worthwhile? Whatever its limitations, the Framework Convention does clearly signal that the world's politicians are noticing global warming - whether as a result of genuine concern, defensiveness or fear. And, however cynical one might be about the many phrases inserted into the treaty to meet the demands of special interest groups, the underlying social, economic and geopolitical issues that climate change exposes have been aired and a forum created in which some resolution may ultimately prove possible.

The climate treaty represents a tentative first step; whether it is a step in the right direction remains to be seen.