The
technocentric differs from the ecocentric in how he would
approach environmental issues, and in his basic ideologies. He is
identified by an apparent undiluted rational, scientific approach,
which particularly translates itself into an economic rationality
founded on the neo-classical school, There is, too, a belief in the
ability and efficiency of management in solving problems by the use
of 'objective analysis' and recourse to the laws of physical
science - the natural authority of which is extended to economic
'laws'.
This management
includes management of the environment - and of men, for unlike the
ecocentric the technocentric turns away from public participation
in environmental and other decision-making in favour of accepting
as authoritative the advice of (scientific and economic)
'experts'. Although this is ostensibly a rational mode,
such rationalism may be stripped away to expose a raw and sometimes
irrational faith - a faith in the idea of progress as expressed in,
and equivalent to, material advancement, in the superiority of
'high' over 'lower' technology, in the sustainability of economic
growth, and in the ability of advanced capitalism to maintain
itself.
Frequently those who
express such faiths have much to gain materially by their
application. And their resultant undetached and unobjective
position manifests itself in an irrationality which clearly
transgresses the technocentric's own terms. Thus a truly
'objective' and 'expert' cost-benefit analysis would probably have
grounded the Concorde project before it ever left the drawing
board. It would probably have stopped the nuclear power plant
building programme of the British Conservative Government which
came to office in 1979, for many economic forcasts of demand for
fast travel and for energy showed that both programmes would be
redundant in the face of Britain's declining future
needs.
However, if
irrationality lies behind the rational facade, so too, according to
does a lack of confidence lie beneath the authoritative expert
aura. For if one 'strips off the veil of optimism' one can reveal
underneath an inherent and disquieting uncertainty, prevarication,
and tendency to error. Thus, the management of British Nuclear
Fuels Ltd. argued vehemently at the 1978 Windscale Inquiry into the
reprocessing of atomic waste, that adequate and stringent safety
precautions were taken at the Cumbrian atomic plant where the
reprocessing was intended. Yet, two years later, a report was
finding evidence of managerial incompetence over radioactive waste
which had leaked some years earlier into the soil surrounding the
plant, while in 1983 Government legal action was contemplated
against the management because of new leaks. And the story of the
accident at the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant in
Pennsylvania in 1979 is studded with examples of the technocrats'
prevarication and error to a remarkable degree. Many follow
ups after failures of management do not assure us that lessons will
be learned and that they could never happen again.
