Francis Bacon and the advancement of learning
It was the ambition of the English thinker and politician Francis Bacon (1561-1626) to show that
science was not Mephistophelean but Promethean, an activity not harmful but beneficial to man.
His work proved the culmination of a process from the late fifteenth and sixteenth centuries which
led to the rebirth of confidence in 'Nature'. By reclaiming the physical world from the grip of Satan,
Bacon successfully showed that science did not necessarily involve a Faustian pact with the Devil,
but could be reconciled with religion. Indeed, he paved the way to a form of scientific deism, with
God the Artificer revealing himself in his created world as much as in his scriptures.
But in his ambition Bacon also established Western scientific project to conquer and
control
nature. Having separated science from religion, it was only a short step for man to see himself as
the measure of all things. The new scientist of the Renaissance became, a man striving for infinite
power, consumed by the ambition to become the 'great Emperor of the world'.
Bacon has long been venerated as the great champion of intellectual liberty, as the
man who drew
the attention of philosophers from abstract speculation to the direct observation of nature. It was
his
method 'continually to dwell among things soberly'. He insisted that those who 'determine not to
conjecture and guess, but to find out and know; not to invent fables and romances of worlds, but to
look into, and dissect the nature of this real world, must consult only things themselves'. To
achieve this end, Bacon wished to keep science separate from religion, constantly reminding his
readers how the progress of science had been hindered by the conservative prejudice of Scholastic
theologians. 'It is therefore most wise,' he wrote, 'soberly to render unto faith the things that are
faith's.'
In his enthusiastic celebration of science shorn of sacred philosophy he inadvertently
summed up
the new conquering attitude towards nature in the brave new world of Renaissance science.
'Knowledge itself is power,' Bacon declared in 1597. Rejecting the deductive reasoning
of the
Scholastic philosophers of his day, he proposed in Of the Advancement of Learning (1605)
his own
inductive method of interpreting nature by which the results of experience are studied in order to
reach a general conclusion.
Science, he argued, would restore man's dominion over the animals which he had lost
after the
Fall. Having been expelled from the Garden of Eden through eating of the tree of knowledge, man's
only way forward was to eat further of the tree and create his own garden in this vale of tears. It
would be hard and painful work, but the goal was comfort and ease on earth. In this way Bacon
reconciled traditional Christianity with the new technological optimism.
Bacon considered that man has a spirit or reasoning power which makes him like God
and a bodily
appetite which makes him like the animals. The virtuous man should therefore seek 'victory over his
nature' and to 'alter and subdue nature' within himself as well as outside himself. The value of
studies was precisely because they 'perfect nature' since natural abilities are 'like natural plants,
that need pruning by study'.
Bacon's considered nature incomplete and corrupt; it was the duty of man to transform
and improve
it. He is not only the lord of creation but its principle of order:
Man, if we look to final
causes, may be regarded as the centre of the world; insomuch that if
man were taken away from the world, the rest would seem to be all astray, without aim or
purpose . . . and leading to nothing. For the whole world works together in the service of man;
and there is nothing from which he does not derive use and fruit . . . insomuch that all things
seem to be going about man's business and not their own.
Bacon castigated his contemporaries for taking an aesthetic interest in nature; 'we
respect,
contemplate and reverence Nature,' he insisted, 'more than is fit'. It is not something of value or
beauty in itself since it 'took beginning from the Word of God by means of confused matter, and the
entrance of prevarication and corruption'. It is therefore man's task to improve and perfect fallen
nature through his science and art. And the way to achieve this is to try to understand it in order
to
control it.
Bacon's attitude to nature comes across most clearly in his metaphor of gardening.
He felt making
a garden, in which man imposes his will on nature, to be the purest of human pleasures. His ideal
allows for the presence of the wild, but it is carefully controlled and circumscribed. In his
management plan there would be 'a green in the entrance, a heath, or desert, in the going forth,
and the main garden in the midst, besides alleys on both sides'. The garden itself would best be
square, encompassed on all sides with a 'stately arched hedge'. It is the model of a bowling green,
with the wilderness beyond the hedges intended to emphasize the security and comfort within.
As Bacon makes clear in his Utopia New Atlantis,the avowed aim of his
philosophy and the end of
the foundation of his ideal society is 'the knowledge of cause, and secret motions of things; and the
enlarging of the bounds of human empire, to the effecting of all things possible'. But Bacon is not
content to observe nature and direct it; he wishes to transform it. A central institution on the island
of Bensalem is a centre for scientific study called Solomon's House. Its spokesman anticipates
modern genetic engineering for plants and animals. He boasts that they experiment with grafting
and inoculating, making by artificial means trees and flowers come on earlier or later than their
seasons, and to reach fruition more speedily than by their natural course. They also make their fruit
greater and sweeter, and of a differing taste, smell, colour and figure from their natural ones.
The most prophetic passage comes when he waxes lyrically about the trials they make
upon
beasts, birds and fishes:
We have also parks and
enclosures of all sorts of beasts and birds, which we use not only for
view or rareness, but likewise for dissection and trials, that thereby we may take light what
may be wrought upon the body of man. Wherein we find many strange effects, as continuing
life in them, though divers parts, which you account vital, be perished and taken forth;
resuscitating of some that seem dead in appearance, and the like. We try, also, all poisons,
and other medicines upon them as well as chirurgery as physic. By art, likewise, we make
them greater or taller than their kind is, and, contrariwise, dwarf them, and stay their growth;
we make them more fruitful and bearing than their kind is, and, contrariwise, barren and not
generative; also we make them different in colour, shape, activity — many ways. We find
means to make conmixtures of divers kinds, which have produced many new kinds, and them
not barren, as the general opinion is.
Bacon is the arch-imperialist of nature, wishing to extend human control to its furthest
corners. The
Royal Society was partly inspired by Solomon's House and, on its inauguration, was proud to
invoke Bacon's name.
It comes as no surprise to learn that Bacon was a powerful statesman as well as a
philosopher.
Having served as Solicitor General, he eventually became Lord Chancellor. In the essay 'Of a King',
it was his considered opinion that 'a king is a mortal god on earth, unto whom the living God hath
lent his own name as a great honour' — a view which no doubt facilitated his own placement
at the
court. The Romantic poet and visionary William Blake was astonished by how much 'Contemptible
Knavery & Folly' Bacon's Essayscontained. It was only in our century that the full nightmare
of the
Lord Chancellor's vision has been realised. Blake declared 'Bacon's philosophy has Ruin'd
England'; two hundred years later one might add that it has ruined the earth itself. It is interesting
that his major work was dedicated to King James I of England, who's claim to scholarship rests on
his monograph supporting witchcraft as an expression of the supernatural power of the Devil.
Descartes and the mastery of nature
Bacon's European contemporary was the Frenchman Rene Descartes (1596—1650), who is
considered the 'father of modern philosophy', also founded analytic geometry. Physics for him was
nothing but mechanics, that is, applied geometry. All physical objects are matter in motion. It was
therefore natural for him to liken the entire universe, including the human body, to a machine.
Everything in his scheme of things consists of matter governed by mechanistic principles. God had
set the universe in motion according to fixed mathematical laws, no different from the laws through
which a king rules his subjects. In his Discourse on Method (1637), Descartes argued that the
goal
of science is to discover these laws in order to understand the elements in nature in sufficient detail
so that 'we might put them in the same way to all the uses for which they are appropriate, and
thereby make ourselves, as it were, masters and possessors of nature'. Human freedom may have
been the central goal for Descartes, but he could only see it in terms of mastery.
Hobbes and the rights of nature
Hobbes was another contemporary of Bacon who best summed up the imperial view of nature in
terms of its state, its rights and the social contract. In his view, in a state of nature without the
law
to restrain individuals, every man would be prey to violent invasion of his life and property by his
fellows. There would be no place for Industry; because the fruit thereof is uncertain: and Culture of
the Earth; no Navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by Sea; no
commodious Building; no Instruments of moving, and removing such things as require much force;
no Knowledge of the face of the Earth; no account of Time; no Arts; no Letters; no Society; and
which is worst of all, continuall feare, and danger of violent death; And the life of man, solitary,
poore, nasty, brutish, and short.
For Hobbes this is not merely hypothetical, for he claims that the 'savage people
in many places in
America' lived in such a brutish manner, in a condition of 'warre, as is of every man, against every
man'. The vision has continued to haunt the Western mind and finds expression in William
Golding's Lord of the Flies. But it is profoundly unhistorical and unanthropological,
a flight of dark
imagination and pathological dread.
The right of nature, Hobbes continues, is the liberty of each man to use his power
to preserve his
own life. The corollary is the law of nature 'a Precept, or generall Rule, found out by Reason, by
which man is forbidden to do, that, which is destructive of his life'. But Hobbes deduces a second
law of nature for reasonable men — to lay down their right to all things and limit their
freedom if all
do the same for the sake of peace. They would, however, have to form a contract and transfer their
rights to a person or body who would make their agreement stick, since for the cynical Hobbes
'Covenants, without the Sword, are but Words'. Obligation to the laws of the state would last only
as long as the sovereign had sufficient coercive power to protect its citizens. Hobbes's sovereign is
a self-perpetuating and absolute ruler who can only be changed by rebellion. As for man's
obligations to animals, they do not exist, because to make covenants with 'brute beasts' is
impossible.
Hobbes offers a brilliant analysis of Western man in a market economy striving for
more power to
obtain wealth and status. Indeed, he insists that 'the Value, or Worth of a man,
is as of all other
things, his Price; that is to say, so much as would be given for the use of his Power'. At
the time
Hobbes's account of equal obligation and natural right was an advance on the doctrine of the divine
right of kings. He also recognizes the equal ability, equal right and equal obligation of all citizens.
But he has a highly atomistic view of society as composed of calculating individuals.
The title page of Leviathan symbolically shows a crowned sovereign whose
body is made up of a
multitude of individuals. Wielding a sword in one hand and a mace in the other, he overlooks the
ordered works of man in transforming nature: a cultivated landscape and walled city. He is flanked
by a castle and a church which represent civil and ecclesiastical authority. It is significant that
Hobbes should call his absolute state the Leviathan, the sea monster in the Bible, synonymous
with a huge and powerful thing. He called his historical account of the Civil War the Behemoth,
another gigantic animal, probably inspired by a hippopotamus. He wished to frighten his
contemporaries with the power of these mythical creatures which could wreak havoc on frail
humanity.
In the final analysis, Hobbes stands as the very antithesis of an ecological sensibility
with his
mechanical view of nature and man, his nightmarish depiction of the state of nature, his celebration
of power, and his artificial and absolute state. Hobbes applies Galileo's and Bacon's mechanical
philosophy to psychology and politics with disastrous results. His system fails to resolve the
paradox that if human beings are as Hobbes describes them, then how can they rationally decide
to make a contract to form a government or even hold together as a community? As his
contemporary Sir William Temple observed; 'Nor do I know, if men are like Sheep, why they need
any government: Or if they are like wolves, how can they suffer it.'
Within industrialism, nonhuman nature is not seen as what it is, but as what it has
become through
the adoption of the late 16th century European imperialist view. It is regarded as a conglomerate of
resources. Forests are thought of as so many board feet of lumber, lakes, rivers and oceans are
viewed as fisheries or sources of water or dumps, in which case they are analyzed in terms of their
"assimilation capacities" to absorb pollution. Farms come to be seen as potential subdivisions,
a
self-fulfilling perception because farm land is taxed according to its "potential," making
agriculture
difficult to sustain when pressures for suburbanization arise. Heidegger, in his critique of
technology, notes, "Everything everywhere is ordered to stand by, to be immediately at hand . .
.
the real everywhere, more or less distinctly, becomes standing-reserve."" Under industrial
regimes,
nonhuman nature becomes something to be restructured in accord with human intention, a
collection of resources to be "developed" for human use.
This was a view of nature taken by the pre-industrial Europeans who were to colonise
North
America. American relations of production were premised upon ecological abundance, and so
attached a higher value to labour than had been the case in Europe. Returns to labour were so high
in America because returns to land were so low.
Land in New England became for the colonists a form of capital, a thing consumed for
the express
purpose of creating augmented wealth. It was the land-capital equation that created the two central
ecological contradictions of the colonial economy. One of these was the inherent conflict between
the land uses of the colonists and those of the Indians. The ecological relationships which
European markets created in New England were inherently antithetical to earlier Indian economies,
and so those economies were transformed—as much through the agency of the Indians as the
Europeans—in ways that need not be repeated here. By 1800, Indians could no longer live the
same seasons of want and plenty that their ancestors had, for the simple reason that crucial
aspects of those seasons had changed beyond recognition.
But there was a second ecological contradiction in the human economy as well. Quite
simply, the
colonists' economic relations of production were ecologically self- destructive. They assumed the
limitless availability of more land to exploit, and in the long run that was impossible. Peter Kalm
described the process whereby colonial farmers used new land until it was exhausted, then turned
it to pasture and cut down another tract of forest. "This kind of agriculture will do for a time,"
he
wrote, "but it will afterwards have bad consequences, as every one may clearly see." Not only
colonial agriculture, but lumbering and the fur trade as well, were able to ignore the problem of
continuous yield because of the temporary gift of nature which fuelled their continuous expansion.
When that gift was finally exhausted, ecosystems and economies alike were forced into new
relationships: expansion could not continue indefinitely.
The implications of this second ecological contradiction stretched well beyond the
colonial period.
Although we often tend to associate ecological changes primarily with industrialism's ideology of
nature that produced the cities and factories of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, it is clear
that changes with similar roots took place just as profoundly in the farms and countrysides of the
colonial period. The transition to capitalism alienated the products of the land as much as the
products of human labour, and so transformed natural communities as profoundly as it did human
ones. By integrating New England ecosystems into an ultimately global capitalist economy,
colonists and Indians together began a dynamic and unstable process of ecological change which
had in no way ended by 1800. We live with their legacy today. When the geographer Carl Sauer
wrote in the twentieth century that Americans had "not yet learned the difference between yield
and
loot," he was describing one of the most long standing tendencies of their way of life. Ecological
abundance and economic prodigality went hand in hand: the people of plenty were a people of
waste.
Linnaeus and the middle way
The 18th century was a period when an attempt was made to adopt an objective attitude to the
natural world as part of the legacy of the scientific revolution which sought to classify and analyze
nature in order to gain greater mastery over it. Linnaeus and his fellow naturalists stand in an
imperial tradition amongst the forerunners of ecology. In his widely influential essay 'The
'Oeconomy of Nature' (1749), Linnaeus sought to discover the hand of God in nature. In the
process, he presented an extremely static portrait of its interactions, bound together by the chains
of sustenance, in which the human species occupies a special place of honour: 'All these
treasures of nature . . . seem intended by the Creator for the sake of man. Everything may be
made subservient to his use. It was man's prerogative to improve nature's economy to enrich
the
human economy, by eliminating the undesirable and multiplying the useful. In this respect,
Linnaeus was chosen by the King of Sweden to carry out a survey of his country's natural
resources as a prelude to economic expansion.
However, this was carried out at a time of transition when Linnaeus (the Swedish botanist
Carl von
Linne) and others in botany to classify plants not in terms of moral status or usefulness but
according to their intrinsic qualities and structures was quite new. Indeed, Linnaeus is said to have
fallen on his knees to give thanks when he first saw gorse in England - a hated enemy of the
agricultural improvers.
Thomas Huxley
Thomas Huxley, like many Victorian's contemplating the rapid industrialisation of
the British
countryside environment, wanted to deny man's participation in the war for survival raging in nature.
On the other hand, they could not resist setting up their battle lines elsewhere. Manly combat for
Victorians such as Huxley and Charles Kingsley had powerful attractions and required only a
morally acceptable arena for its pursuit. Huxley's solution was to shift the focus of violence from
a
man- man to a man-nature confrontation. This was also the recommendation of the American
philosopher William James in his 1910 essay "A Moral Equivalent to War." It was seen by both
men as wholly legitimate, even honorific, to act aggressively toward nature, so long as that
aggression was performed in the name of humanity, decency, virtue, and even health and
cleanliness. They were intent on carrying the crusade against nature to the actual physical surface
of the earth, on making the land over to serve as a kind of visible, external evidence of their
accession to grace. Huxley's favorite metaphor for this ethic of ecological transformation was the
image of the Garden of Eden, implying a civilized landscape surrounded by a wall to guard it from
the Darwinian chaos. This garden was to be a place of virtue, but also of material productivity; the
two ends were mutually reinforcing. It was, however, to be an expanding kingdom that one day
would embrace the entire world. Already, in Tasmania, Huxley saw the walls moving out to encircle
new territory, where a domesticated, "English" flora and fauna were replacing the native wilderness.
If humans would restrain their self- seeking ambitions and work for the "corporate whole,"
they
would see this process spread everywhere to create "an earthly paradise, a true Garden of Eden,
in
which all things should work together towards the well-being of the gardeners." Civilization,
according to nature imperialists, became a process of pacification of nature by concerted force. In
its train would come not only a more perfectly moral world but the rich rewards of productivity,
wealth, and comfort for the human species.
Thus, the way was open to manage nature according to desirable economic objectives,
which for
the Victorians was wealth from mass-production. Ironically, managerialism was at the root of
conservation. In the early 1900s Roosevelt's Chief Forester, Gifford Pinchot defined conservation
as "the fundamental material policy of human civilization". He referred to forest conservation
as
"tree farming." Instead of mining the woodlands, his corps of rangers would replant cut-over
lands,
just as a farmer replants his crops each year. "Forestry is handling trees so that one crop follows
another' he explained.
The purpose of Forestry, then, is to make the forest produce the largest possible
amount of
whatever crop or service will be most useful, and keep on producing it for generation after
generation of men and trees. ... A well-handled farm gets more and more productive as the years
pass; so does a well-handled forest.
Like Francis Bacon, Pinchot saw the world as badly in need of managing, and he was
convinced
that science could teach man to improve on nature, to make its processes more efficient and its
crops more abundant. He would not go as far as the Germans toward intensive cultivation, or
establish as they did, tree farms that resembled factories in their planned orderliness—there
was
not enough manpower in America to manage nature that intensively over so vast a space. But he
would insist that all renewable natural resources, especially forests and wildlife, be approached in
the future as crops to be planted, harvested, and cultivated by skilled experts. And like any efficient
farmer, he could see value in the land chiefly where it could be turned to profit.
Another aspect of the imperial view is that in a domesticated world some species are
turned into
pests. They are reduced to the status of marauder. Selected plants and animals become outcasts
and an elusive challenge to the controlling, contriving hand of man in the agrarian economy.
Moreover certain animal predators, such as the wolf, come to be seen as moral offenders, a
species of "vermin" that must be eradicated—by any available means. In the pursuit
of economic
gain, or emotional equilibrium with nature we have singled out enemies as well as chosen
favourites. The Anglo-American mind has exhibited a peculiarly intense moralism that, in this case,
assigns every species to an absolute ethical category: good or bad. A few wild animals, songbirds
chiefly, have been pronounced good; everything else is of use only for target practice. And "varmint"
has been the very worst epithet in America's moral lexicon, a label reserved for those species that
plumb the depths of depravity. Essentially these are the animals with teeth and claws: the
carnivores, including wolves, pumas, bears—and latest in line, coyotes. The survival of
the coyote
represents an outrageous defiance of man's righteous empire over nature.
Behind Pinchot's conservation philosophy lay an environmental tradition stretching
all the way back
to the eighteenth century: progressive, scientific agriculture. From the time of "Turnip"
Townshend
and Arthur Young, who taught England how to make two blades of grass grow where one grew
before, progressive agriculture had always promoted a kind of conservation. Its spokesmen had
long been a force for closer management of water and woodlands. They had awakened earlier
generations to the threat of soil erosion, developed contour ploughing, and invented chemical
fertilizers to make the earth more productive. In America they had established a number of land
grant colleges where students were taught the gospel of wise land use.
The Imperial tradition is still with us in our age of computer-run organizations and
it was probably
inevitable that ecology too would come to emphasize the flow of goods and services—or of
energy—in a kind of automated, robotized, pacified nature. The managerial ethos has come to the
rescue of nature. Ecologists have stepped forward to manage the natural environment. That it has
been mismanaged for so long is urged as a sufficient reason for putting scientists and scientifically-
trained experts in charge now. Entire university science programmes appear under the title
"Environmental Management." And indeed, our current preocupation with bioeconomics has given
would-be managers working the the strategic objectives of biodiversity action plans plenty to work
on.
The Baconian sense of mission is not yet dead. N. P. Naumov, probably a leading ecologist
in the
latter day Soviet Union, admitted that "the goal of studying the factors of productivity is to
raise it."
This ideal, he suggests, may be realized "by changing organic nature, the species content and
ratios, and the means of using and managing the populations."
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