In antiquity and in Middle Ages, nature was a living and direct manifestation of God's
omnipotence,
a source of awe and reverence for people. This is the way things were. But the coming of the era of
the ideology of humanism, free of all manifestations of religion, developed an entirely new
relationship to nature. Almost everything that surrounds us now is a product of human activity in
our time.
Hardly anyone today needs to be told that the biosphere of this planet is endangered,
and that its
ability to support life, including human life, can no longer be taken for granted. Yet as recently as
thirty-five years ago, the concept of ecology was little known outside the biological sciences. In the
late 1950s and early 1960s, when social theorist Murray Bookchin first began to develop the ideas
that became social ecology, few people were aware that an environmental crisis was looming. In
the decades since, in numerous books and articles and through a wide range of political activities,
Bookchin has articulated social ecology into a distinctive set of ideas for radical social
transformation.
In contrast to viewpoints that offer strictly biological, religious, or technological
explanations, social
ecology emphasizes that the ecological crisis has its origins in social relations--in the way in which
human beings have been organized into various economic and political institutions over the course
of history. In this account, the very idea of dominating the natural world (first nature) initially
emerged with the social domination of human by human, that is, into hierarchies and exploitative
classes. As the anthropological and historical records show, such domination--according to age,
then gender, ethnicity, and race, as well as distinct economic classes--preceded and gave rise to
the idea of dominating the biosphere. Social ecology adds that the mastery of some human social
groups by others in early societies made it possible for people even to conceive of mastering the
natural world in the intersts of social and finally class elites. Social ecology is therefore opposed
to
all forms of hierarchy and domination, as well as to class exploitation and oppression.
The effort by some sections of the ecology movement to prioritize a pantheistic, often
mystical
"eco-spirituality" over social analysis raises serious questions about their ability to come
to grips
with reality. At a time when a blind social mechanism, the market, is turning soil into sand,
covering fertile land with concrete, poisoning air and water, and producing sweeping climatic and
atmospheric changes, we cannot ignore the impact that hierarchical and class society has on the
natural world. Economic growth, gender oppressions, and ethnic domination--not to speak of
corporate, state, and bureaucratic interests--are much more capable of shaping the future of the
natural world than are privatistic forms of spiritual self- regeneration.
Some ecological outlooks blame human beings generically for the ecological crisis,
as if the
species itself was tainted with some irreversible defect. By contrast, social ecology, as an
expressly ecological humanism, sees human beings as the most differentiated and complex life-
forms on the planet, without which neither consciousness nor freedom would exist. Potentially, at
least, human beings are the only possible source of an ethics on this planet, especially an ethics
that calls for the preservation of the biosphere.
The crucial question we face today -- not only for ourselves as human beings but for
the entire
biosphere -- is how social evolution will proceed and in what direction it will go. To deal with this
question primarily as a matter of spiritual renewal, desirable as that may be. is not only evasive but
socially disarming. Social evolution took a wrong turn ages ago when it shifted from egalitarian
institutions and relations to hierarchical ones. It took an even worse turn a few centuries ago when
it shifted from a relatively cooperative society to a highly competitive one. If we are to bring society
and nature into accord with each other, we must develop a movement that fulfills the evolutionary
potential of humanity and society, that is to say, turn the human world into a self- conscious agent
of the natural world and enhance the evolutionary process -- natural and social. Given an ecological
society, our technology can be placed as much in the service of natural evolution as it can be
placed in the service of a rational social evolution.
Humanity, like all natural creatures, inhabits specific ecological locations, or “ecosystems.”
As
each creature has its own species- specific pattern of ecosystem, so the human ecosystem is
distinct from that of all other creatures, and expressive of humanity’s own specific “nature” within
the manifold of nature. Marx, often regarded as an anthropocentric thinker seeing humanity as
essentially over nature and basically distinct from it, was in fact profoundly concerned about human
nature and our organic relation to nature. The core human-natural relationship for Marx is
expressed in the fact of production, the transformative activity of labour that brings this about, and
the subjective, or imaginative, interiority necessary for this. In this regard, humans produce their
own ecosystems, and at the same time, define and reflect upon them. Such is our “nature,” and
the way we produce ecosystemic relations depends upon whether nature is degraded or restored to
integrity.
The formal properties that apply here can be summed up as follows:
- ecosystems that tend toward wholeness
may be defined as integral, in which case they
flourish and give rise to new form;
- ecosystems that fragment or become
static and collapse can be defined as disintegrating.
The former engage a pattern of differentiation, in which elements of
the ecosystem are distinct but
connected; while the latter employ one of splittingin which elements lack common being
and
move along separate pathshence disintegrate. Differentiation is a notion within dialectics: the
elements are distinct, even clash, but remain connected and give rise to new configurations of form.
Splitting, on the other hand, is identitarian; it drives not toward wholeness but toward totalization,
and, within the ceaseless flow of ecological relations, toward eventual breakdown.